This comprehensive and important volume includes contributions by activists, journalists, lawyers and scholars from twenty-one countries. The essays map the directions the movement for women's rights is taking--and will take in the coming decades--and the concomittant transformation of prevailing notions of rights and issues. They address topics such as the rapes in former Yugoslavia and efforts to see that a War Crimes Tribunal responds; domestic violence; trafficking of women into the sex trade; the persecution of lesbians; female genital mutilation; and (...) reproductive rights. (shrink)

There is a growing recognition, stemming from work with both vertebrates and invertebrates, that the capacity for neuronal regeneration is critically dependent on the local microenvironment. That environment is largely created by the non‐neuronal elements of the nervous system, the neuroglia. Therefore an understanding of how glial cells respond to injury is crucial to understanding neuronal regeneration. Here we examine the process of repair in a relatively simple nervous system, that of the insect, in which it is possible to define (...) precisely the cellular events of the repair process. This repair is rapid and well organised; it involves the recruitment of blood cells, the division of endogenous glial elements and, possibly, migration from pre‐existing glial pools in adjacent ganglia. There are clear parallels between the events of repair and those of normal glial development. It seems likely that the ability of the insect central nervous system to repair resides in the retention of developmental capacities throughout its life and that damage results in the activation of this potential. (shrink)

J. Matthew Ashley’s Renewing Theology compellingly argues that academic theology needs renewal by way of a “living circulation” with spirituality. The latter may be an animating force for the former, assuring that theology, even in its academic form, arises from concrete experiential encounter with God. Ashley rec­ommends Ignatian spirituality as a tradition distinctively suited to renewing theology in late modernity, and offers detailed accounts of Karl Rahner’s, Ignacio Ellacuría’s, and Pope Francis’s diverse theological appropriations of Ignatian spirituality to (...) substantiate his case. Among the book’s numerous successes is Ashley’s creative presentation of Rahner as retrieving Ignatian spirituality so as to present a message and mission of consolation to the modern world; thus Rahner can be a productive model for academic theology today. (shrink)

The medium surrounding cells either in culture or in tissues contains a chemical mix varying with cell state. As solutes move in and out of the cytoplasmic compartment they set up characteristic signatures in the cellular boundary layers. These layers are complex physical and chemical environments the profiles of which reflect cell physiology and provide conduits for intercellular messaging. Here we review some of the most relevant characteristics of the extracellular/intercellular space. Our initial focus is primarily on cultured cells but (...) we extend our consideration to the far more complex environment of tissues, and discuss how chemical signatures in the boundary layer can or may affect cell function. Critical to the entire essay are the methods used, or being developed, to monitor chemical profiles in the boundary layers. We review recent developments in ultramicro electrochemical sensors and tailored optical reporters suitable for the task in hand. (shrink)

Recovering Reason: Essays in Honor of Thomas L. Pangle is a collection of essays composed by students and friends of Thomas L. Pangle to honor his seminal work and outstanding guidance in the study of political philosophy. These essays examine both Socrates' and modern political philosophers' attempts to answer the question of the right life for human beings, as those attempts are introduced and elaborated in the work of thinkers from Homer and Thucydides to Nietzsche and Charles Taylor.

Bioethicists often draw sharp distinctions between hope and states like denial, self-deception, and unrealistic optimism. But what, exactly, is the difference between hope and its more suspect cousins? One common way of drawing the distinction focuses on accuracy of belief about the desired outcome: Hope, though perhaps sometimes misplaced, does not involve inaccuracy in the way that these other states do. Because inaccurate beliefs are thought to compromise informed decision making, bioethicists have considered these states to be ones where intervention (...) is needed either to correct the person’s mental state or to persuade the person to behave differently, or even to deny the person certain options. In this article, we argue that it is difficult to determine whether a patient is really in denial, self-deceived, or unrealistically optimistic. Moreover, even when we are confident that beliefs are unrealistic, they are not always as harmful as critics contend. As a result, we need to be more permissive in our approach to patients who we believe are unrealistically optimistic, in denial, or self-deceived—that is, unless patients significantly misunderstand their situation and thus make decisions that are clearly bad for them, we should not intervene by trying to change their mental states or persuade them to behave differently, or by paternalistically denying them certain options. (shrink)

v. 1. Religion and the powers of the common life -- v. 2. The spirit and the modern authorities -- v. 3. Christ and the dominions of civilization -- v. 4. Globalization and grace.

Do perceptual states necessarily constitute evidence epistemically supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs? Susanna Schellenberg thinks so. She argues that perceptual states, veridical or not, necessarily provide (or constitute) a kind of evidence (for the existence of the truth-maker) supporting corresponding perceptual beliefs. She uses “phenomenal evidence” as a label for this kind of evidence and calls her argument “The Phenomenal Evidence Argument.” Having introduced her project, we offer a reconstruction of Schellenberg’s argument (Sect. 2 ). A key premise has it that, (...) necessarily, for items with a function, fulfillment of the function (the good case) is explanatorily and metaphysically prior to function failure (the bad case). We suggest that the etiological theory of functions renders this key premise plausible (Sect. 3 ). However, Schellenberg rejects the etiological theory of functions (Sect. 4 ) and likewise the idea that the epistemic or warranting force of perceptual states is grounded in their being reliably linked to veridical perception (Sect. 5 ). But then what supports the key premise? Schellenberg argues that accurate perception is a part of the _nature_ of perceptual capacities because the nature of perceptual capacities is explained in terms of their function, and their function is to represent accurately (Sect. 6 ). We suggest that Schellenberg is committed to an understanding of priority which doesn’t require any _actual_ good cases—just possible ones (Sect. 7 ). This reading, we argue, is too weak to support the key premise (Sect. 8 ). Given Schellenberg’s commitments, it is not necessarily the case that perceptual states are evidence for a corresponding perceptual belief. Before concluding we discuss an overgeneralization objection to Schellenberg’s argument (Sect. 9 ). (shrink)

A. F. Losev, one of the most important Russian philosophers and historians of ancient aesthetics and culture in the 20th century, develops in his ‘Dialectics of the Myth’ (Dialektika mifa), 1930, a personalistic ontology by using elements of neoplatonic philosophy and Orthodox Christian belief. According to Losev reality in all its different expressions and ontological strata must be understood as “mythical”, i.e. as “living mutual exchange of subject and object”. The subjective and personal aspect of reality is not grounded in (...) man’s epistemic relation to it alone; reality in itself has to be characterized as personal and subjective. The main philosophical opponent is Descartes, the founder of “modern rationalism and mechanism”. (shrink)

Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s (...) evidentialist view is superior, the evidentialism per se can be purged from it, leaving a general structure of defeat that can be incorporated in a reliabilist theory that is neither evidentialist nor responsibilist in any way. (shrink)

Washington, D.C.’s City Council has recently taken the first step towards legalizing the use of “medical marijuana” in accordance with the provisions of the Legalization of Marijuana for Medical Treatment Initiative of 1998. This action was not overruled by the United States Congress within the 30-day deadline imposed by the District of Columbia’s Home Rule Statute. The Council is now crafting regulations that will govern the therapeutic and palliative use of this drug with the goal of avoiding some of the (...) problems faced by the other states that have legalized medical marijuana; however, the proposed rules do not establish criteria for legitimate medical practice when medical marijuana is recommended. If the enabling regulations are passed by the D.C. Council and not rejected by the Congress, the District of Columbia will join over onequarter of the states in legalizing medical marijuana. On the other hand, if the D.C. Council fails to act favorably on the final regulations, then the effective legalization of medical marijuana will die and not be reconsidered until next year. (shrink)

Alvin Goldman’s paper “What Is Justified Belief" and his book Epistemology and Cognition pioneered reliabilist theories of epistemic justifiedness. In light of counterexamples to necessity and counterexamples to sufficiency, Goldman has offered a number of refinements and modifications. This paper focuses on those refinements that relativize the justification conferring force of a belief-forming process to its reliably producing a high ratio of true beliefs over falsehoods in special circumstances: reliability in the actual world, in normal worlds, and in nonmanipulated environments. (...) This paper argues that Goldman’s refinements fall short and suggests instead the relativization to reliability in normal circumstances. Normal circumstances are those where the belief-forming process acquired the etiological function of reliably inducing true beliefs. This theory invites the Swampman objection. Two lines of response are pursued. (shrink)

Despite his hostility to religion in his early career, since the turn of the century Habermas has devoted his research to the relationship between faith and knowledge. His two-volume Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie is the culmination of this project. Spurred by the attacks of 9/11 and the growing conflict between religion and the forces of secularization, I argue that this philosophy of history is the centerpiece of an important turning point in Habermas’s intellectual development. Instead of interpreting religion merely (...) as part of the history of postmetaphysical thinking, Habermas now sees it as a crucial normative resource for both philosophy and social cohesion in the future aswell. Despite its backward-looking approach,my basic thesis is that this book is best understood as a forward-looking appeal for a tolerant, self-reflective democratic politics that brings religious and secular citizens together dialogically through the cooperative use of their rational freedom. (shrink)

Followers’ perceptions of their leaders’ ethics have the potential to impact the way they react to the influence of these leaders. The present study of 365 U.S. Air Force Academy Cadets examined how followers’ perceptions of their leaders’ ethics moderated the relationships found between the leaders’ use of power, as conceptualized by French and Raven, and the followers’ contextual performance. Our results indicated that leaders’ use of expert, referent, and reward power was associated with higher levels of organizational citizenship behaviors (...) among their followers when the followers perceived these leaders to be more ethical. Moreover, when followers perceived their leaders to be less ethical, these followers reported lower levels of OCBs when their leaders’ utilized referent power. Practical implications, limitations, and future research are also discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUSSERL ON GALILEO'S INTENTIONAI,ITY 1JHE PROBLEM OF THE compatibility between pheomenology and history is the unique problem characterizing Edmund Husserl's The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.1 Husserl attempts to resolve the pvoblem by directly investigating the crisis of the modern sciences-a crisis which he claims begins with Galileo. The aim of this essay is to evaluate critically Husserl's assessment of Galileo as the originator of the crisis. (...) I hope to show that, given Husserl's own demands for the proper historico-phenomenological investigation of the crisis, his conclusions about Galileo are not justified. This will be accomplished, in part, by using some of the work on Galileo done by William A. Wallace, 0.P. THE "ORIGIN" OF THE CRISIS Husserl describes the crisis of European sciences in terms of a teleological movement. The telos began with the radical change effected by the ancient Greeks in their recognition that reason is essential to humanity, and that reason is the entelechy of humanity.2 For the Greeks, one of the exigencies of reason is a universal knowledge of what is, in which truth in itself, episteme, is attainable. The telic character of reason is revealed in the fact that reason in its philosophical mode continually moves from latent to manifest reason beginning with the Greeks. Husserl writes: "... the telos... was inborn in 1 Translated, with an introduction, by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) ; abbreviation: Orisis. 2 See Carr's Introduction p. xxxviii to the Orisis for a discussion of the sense in which the Greeks' change was a radical one. 680 HUSSERL ON GALILEO'S INTENTIONALITY 681 European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy-that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature..." 3 The search for a universal knowledge initially had a " na'ive obviousness " which from the very beginning was not immune to transformations that eventually would increase and achieve greater and greater sophistication. For Husserl, the transformations are brought about by skepticism, which, in its denial of the presence of reason in " the factually experienced world," finally reaches the point where "... the deepest essential interrelation between reason and what is in general, the enigma of all enigmas, has to become the actual theme of inquiry." 4 This inquiry ought to be the task for contemporary philosophy. Such a task has been recognized to a certain extent beginning with Hume and on through Kant and beyond. What Hume and Kant attempted with regard to the Renaissance renewal of the ancient Greek ideal of a universal philosophy, Husserl prescribes in a more radical way for Hume and Kant themselves, indeed, for the whole of the history of philosophy and (modern) science.5 Husserl's immediate task will be to overcome the naive rationalism of the eighteenth-century and the "unnoticed na'ivetes" of the present day, so that the genuine sense of rationalism may be established. A philosophy is needed which would bring the entelechy of reason to its realization; this is, Husserl explains, reason "... fully conscious of itself in its own essential form, i.e. the form of a. universal philosophy which grows through consistent apodictic insight and supplies its own norms thl'ough an apodictic method." 6 Such a task is intrinsically historical since the manifestation of reason can only come about through concepts, problems, and methods which s Husserl, p. 15. 4 Ibid., p. 13. s Ibid., p. 1. 6 Ibid., p. 16. 682 PETER J. CATALDO are themselves inescapably inherited. We must proceed, then, by "exhibiting" and "testing" the "inner meaning and hidden teleology" of philosophy's history. Husserl concludes: What is clearly necessary (what else could be of help here?) is that we reflect back, in a thorough historical and critical fashion, in order to provide, before all decisions, for a radical self-understanding ; we must inquire back into what was originally and always sought in philosophy, what was continually sought by all the philosophers and philosophies that have communicated with one another historically; but this must include a... (shrink)

The norm of assertion, to be in force, is a social norm. What is the content of our social norm of assertion? Various linguistic arguments purport to show that to assert is to represent oneself as knowing. But to represent oneself as knowing does not entail that assertion is governed by a knowledge norm. At best these linguistic arguments provide indirect support for a knowledge norm. Furthermore, there are alternative, non-normative explanations for the linguistic data (as in recent work from (...) Van Elswyk). Direct arguments would rely on normative judgments about the permissibility or impermissibility of assertions with and without the speaker knowing the content asserted. John Turri's work experimental results purport to show that our norm of assertion is factive, and probably knowledge. But as a number of recent experimentalists (Kneer, Reuter and Broessel, Marsili and Wiegmann) have shown, Turri's results rely on the problemmatic use of 'should' as in 'Maria should assert that she owns a 1990 watch.' Correcting for this, these experimentalists provide strong evidence that our norm of assertion is not factive. The standard reply to evidence like this from the assertion of unlucky falsehoods is the excuse maneuver. But Marsili and Wiegmann, following Turri's protocol for testing for excuse validation, show that participants who judge that assertions unlucky falsehoods are permissible are not guilty of excuse validation. Given our current understanding of the experimental evidence, knowledge is not our norm of assertion. (shrink)

Diagrams refer to the phenomena overtly represented, to analogous phenomena, and to previous pictures and their graphic conventions. The diagrams of ecologists Clarke, Hutchinson, and H.T. Odum reveal their search for physical analogies, building on the success of World War II science and the promise of cybernetics. H.T. Odum's energy circuit diagrams reveal also his aspirations for a universal and natural means of reducing complexity to guide the management of diverse ecological and social systems. Graphic conventions concerning framing and translation (...) of ecological processes onto the flat printed page facilitate Odum's ability to act as if ecological relations were decomposable into systems and could be managed by analysts external to the system. (shrink)

In 1994, Maudlin proposed proposed an objection to the transactional interpretation, involving an absorber that changes location depending on the trajectory of the particle. Maudlin considered this objection fatal. However, the TI did not die; rather, a number of responses were developed, some attempting to accommodate Maudlin's example within the existing TI, and others modifying the TI. I argue that none of these responses is fully adequate. The reason, I submit, is that there are two aspects to Maudlin's objection; the (...) more readily soluble aspect has received all the attention, but the more problematic aspect has gone unnoticed. I consider the prospects for developing a succesful version of the TI in light of this second aspect of the objection. (shrink)

Physician Assisted Suicide is illegal in Rhode Island. The Lila Manfield Sapinsley Compassionate Care Act would make PAS legal if passed into law and it was reintroduced in 2021 in the General Assembly of Rhode Island. This guest editorial was published in The Rhode Island Catholic in Newport, Rhode Island, on May 20, 2021.

The article sums up a number of points made by the author concerning the response to Darwinism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and repeats the claim that a proper understanding of the theory's impact must take account of the extent to which what are now regarded as the key aspects of Darwin's thinking were evaded by his immediate followers. Potential challenges to this position are described and responded to.

If you want to understand McDowell's spatial metaphors when he talks about perceptual knowledge, place him side-by-side with Dretske on perceptual knowledge. Though McDowell shows no evidence of reading Dretske's writings on knowledge from the late 1960s onwards (McDowell mentions "Epistemic Operators" once in passing), McDowell gives the same four arguments as Dretske for the conclusion that knowledge requires "conclusive" reasons that rule of the possibility of mistake. Despite various differences, we think it is best to read McDowell as re-discovering (...) Dretske on perceptual knowledge. Since Dretske is easy to understand, all of McDowell's metaphors become easy to understand. But what about McDowell's disjunctivism? Turns out McDowell is not an ontological disjunctivist, and his epistemological disjunctivism is really just the banal point that some perceptual experiences provide conclusive reasons for perceptual belief and some do not. Perceptual experiences are either conclusive or inconclusive. Dretske would agree. (shrink)

The authors offer a fresh look at the debate about the use of assisted nutrition and hydration in advanced dementia. The philosophical and ethical issues are presented. The importance of distinguishing basic care from medical acts is explained. A key question is addressed: Does ANH nourish and hydrate the patient with dementia? The ANH debate is placed in its cultural context and contrasted with the Catholic response. A clinical analysis of the evidence for benefit and harm of ANH in advanced (...) dementia is given. The authors point out the lack of hard evidence against ANH, discuss questions that need further clinical research, and argue that there is sufficient evidence for a presumption, in principle, in favor of ANH in patients with advanced dementia. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.1 : 53–63. (shrink)

Robert Audi’s Seeing, Knowing, and Doing argues that knowledge does not entail justification, given a broadly externalist conception of knowledge and an access internalist conception of justification, where justification requires the ability to cite one’s grounds or reasons. On this view, animals and small children can have knowledge while lacking justification. About cases like these and others, Audi concludes that knowledge does not entail justification. But the access internalist sense of “justification” is but one of at least two ordinary senses (...) of the term. On a broader or looser sense, “justification” means “being in the right” where that involves meeting a standard or norm. I argue that the beliefs of animals and small children can then meet standards or norms associated with truth and knowledge such that their beliefs may count as justified in this broader or looser sense. I then question whether knowledge fails to entail justification on this broader sense. (shrink)

Niccolo Machiavelli’s teachings have never gone out of fashion; no doubt because power remains a central aspect of modern political and corporate life. The writings of this 16th century thinker seem as relevant today as they were a half millennium ago. Given the immutable nature of human beings, this is hardly surprising. What is surprising is the regular stream of monographs published in the last third of the 20th century, and reaching a crescendo in the last decade, that argue for (...) Machiavelli’s relevance to modern management and corporate leadership. This essay will examine the structure, assumptions and conclusions of these manuals. After reviewing the manuals, this essay concludes that certain of these assumptions upon which these manuals are based are not transferable from a 16th century principality to a 21st century corporation. Not surprisingly, the teachings of these manuals concerning morality and the corporation are either inconsistent with the actual teachings of Machiavelli, or fail to acknowledge the teachings of Machiavelli most relevant to the modern corporate world. (shrink)

For some of the world's great thinkers, including Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hegel, philosophy is a vast system of fixed, capital-T Truth for humankind to discover, explore and comprehend. For others, even among those with philosophies as diverse as William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein, philosophy is simply a tool, or a process for ascertaining individual factual truths specific to a given time and place. It is often said that if you ask any ten philosophers to define their subject, you're likely to (...) get ten different answers. Here, presented for non-specialist readers, is an easy-to-understand survey of ideas put forth by 100 important philosophers, from the pre-Socratics of ancient Greece to the analytic philosophers of the present day. Each thinker is summarized in a single illustrated page, or in many instances, in a two-page spread. Each entry includes the philosopher's birth and death dates, titles of major works, major influences, a capsule biographical sketch, and a brief summary of his or her most important ideas. In addition to philosophers in our own Western tradition, readers will find Chinese sages, including Confucius and Lao-tzu, the Indian Buddhist philosopher Ngrjuna, and thinkers representing other cultures. Just a few of the 100 important thinkers represented in this book are: Plato Aristotle Augustine of Hippo Roger Bacon Thomas Aquinas Thomas Hobbes John Locke Rene Descartes Baruch Spinoza Immanuel Kant G.W.F. Hegel Friedrich Nietzsche William James Ludwig Wittgenstein Martin Heidegger Jean-Paul Sartre Alfred Jules Ayer Willard V.O. Quine Thomas Kuhn Donald Davidson and many othersThe text is enhanced with more than 250 illustrations and a glossary of philosophical terms. (shrink)